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REPLY
Taxpayer Standing from Flast to Hein
Carl H. Esbeck*
There are two preliminary matters with respect to Professor Maya Manian's response to
my extended essay2 that need addressing. First, Manian's overall lament is that my essay
concerning Justice Alito's plurality opinion controlling the result in Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, Inc.3 pays insufficient homage to strict separation of church and state. My
essay could just as easily have elicited a passionate scold that I was woefully undervaluing the
doctrine of separation of powers which Hein slighted by not overruling Flast v. Cohen.
4
However, church-state separation and separation of powers are of equal value in the
Constitution. As my essay candidly admits, the Court in Hein had before it the proverbial "hard
choice" of trying to sensibly mediate between clashing constitutional imperatives. Policing the
line between church and state, while at the same time policing the Judicial Branch so that it does
not exceed its powers by entertaining cases where the plaintiff is without standing, are
constitutional "goods" of equal merit, and Justice Alito's opinion made a plausible case for
striking the line between no-establishment and standing based on doing the least harm to these
two restraints. Curiously, Manian has little to say about separation of powers as honored in Hein
by maintaining the traditional requirements for standing. Separation of powers was the motor
that caused Hein to be decided the way it was decided, yet Manian's response warms only when
chatting on about the separation of church and state. I too value church-state separation, but
candor compels me to acknowledge that it is but one "good" nested in a Constitution of multiple
"goods." The Constitution provides no sliding scale for privileging one "good" above others.
Indeed, it is Flast taxpayer standing that is the "exception to the rule," as Manian thrice reminds
5
us.
This brings me to the second preliminary matter. Manian's response repeatedly
exaggerates the scope of the principle of law stated in the Hein plurality. Her second paragraph,
for example, says that Hein declined to extend "taxpayer standing as a means to challenge
executive expenditures that violate the Establishment Clause.",6 The line drawn by the Hein
plurality, however, is not between congressional expenditures and executive expenditures.
Rather, the focus is on discretionary expenditures by the executive. Indeed, the line is not even
Carl H. Esbeck is the R.B. Price Professor and the Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law at the
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1 Maya Manian, Response, Hein and the Goldilocks Principle, 79 Miss. L.J. MISSING SOURCES 178 (2010),
http://mslj.law.olemiss.edu/mlj-online/volume79/responses/Manian.pdf.
2 Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us about the Roberts Court and the Establishment Clause, 78
Miss. L.J. 199 (2008).
3 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion). The controlling plurality was written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Id. at 592. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 615. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 618.
4 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In a challenge under the Establishment Clause to federal legislation that provided limited
funding to primary and secondary schools, including religious schools, the Court concluded that plaintiffs had
standing to bring the lawsuit as federal taxpayers. Id. at 103-06.
Manian, supra note 1, at 178-79, 182.
6 Id. at 178; see also id. at 178-80.
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drawn where the executive has some discretion with respect to the expenditure being challenged.
For example, where a congressional social-service program awards grants to private-sector
providers, it is left to the Executive Branch to exercise discretion with respect to selecting those
grant applications that are most in line with the purposes of the program.7 What the controlling
plurality in Hein said is that Flast taxpayer standing is not permitted when the congressional
appropriation is for the general operations of the Executive Branch, as it was in Hein where the
appropriation was for the operations of the Executive Office of the President. Money spent on
those operations is deeply imprinted with the policy initiative of the President. Accordingly,
Justice Alito's plurality withheld standing to file a lawsuit challenging the signature domestic
policy of an elected President by plaintiffs, self-proclaimed strict separationists who could show
no more injury than that they paid federal taxes and professed displeasure with the President's
policy. If ever there was a time for the Judicial Branch to refrain from interfering with the
internal workings of a coordinate Branch, this would be that time. To do otherwise would permit
anyone who registered opposition to the President's policies at the ballot box on the first
Tuesday in November to then get a second chance at defeating the President's policies by suing
on the next twentieth of January. Moreover, in this second go around, in Manian's view the
opposition gets to enlist the aid of the Judicial Branch.
With those two preliminary matters behind us, I turn to my central problem with
Professor Manian's response. Unlike Manian, my extended essay was not squarely about what is
the right view or the wrong view of the Establishment Clause with respect to government
appropriations-well-trod ground that fill to overflowing the pages of law journals. Rather, as
the title to the essay suggested, I sought to take the reader behind that question and to look at
how the Supreme Court's position on standing is a proxy for the modern Court's presuppositions
back of its sometimes bewildering applications of the Establishment Clause. When I published
the essay in the early fall of 2008, there was keen interest in Hein because both Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito were new to the Court. 8 We had only inklings with respect to their
7 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). Justice Alito notes the continuing validity
of the holding in Bowen v. Kendrick, but distinguishes it from the facts in Hein. Id. at 606-08 (citing Bowen, 487
U.S. 589 (1988)). On the question of standing, Bowen held that federal taxpayer standing under Flast was permitted
where plaintiffs challenged, on Establishment Clause grounds, a congressional appropriation to a social-service
program where private-sector organizations, including religious organizations, were eligible for discretionary grant
awards by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to operate counseling programs addressing the needs
surrounding teen sexuality. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 618-20.
8 Since the decision in Hein, the Court has handed down only one additional case indicating the justices' substantive
views on the Establishment Clause. As in Hein, a badly splintered Court in Salazar v. Buono held that a federal trial
court had erred when it enjoined the Department of Interior from implementing a congressional land-transfer statute
which had the effect of changing a plot of land on which stood a Latin cross from government-owned land to
privately owned land. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality opinion). The basis for the trial court's ruling had
been that the Latin cross unconstitutionally endorsed religion. Id. at 1812. Given the overall context, a three-justice
plurality on the Court was of the belief that the Latin cross was a war memorial, not an unconstitutional endorsement
of Christianity. Id. at 1816-17. Accordingly, the Court plurality held that the trial court was wrong to enjoin the
congressionally ordered transfer of the plot on which the cross stood to private ownership. Id. at 1820.
Nevertheless, by a 4-4 vote the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. See id. at 1820-21 (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts); id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., joined by Justice Thomas, stating the Court had no
jurisdiction over the appeal because plaintiff lacked standing). Assuming plaintiff still wants to pursue the matter,
the trial court is to reopen the record as well as hear argument on whether passage of the congressional land-swap
statute unconstitutionally endorsed religion. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and joined in part by Justice Alito. Id. at 1808. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a brief concurring
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substantive positions on the Establishment Clause, and it is never known how being elevated to
the High Bench might cause one's earlier views to evolve. Equally interesting was that Justice
O'Connor had recently retired from the Court and hence her "endorsement test" might wane.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy, a swing justice along with Justice O'Connor on no-establishment
matters, might re-adjust his role given that he alone was expected to control the balance of power
on a 4-1-4 Court when it came to many church-state questions.
Manian said she understood my essay to be about how standing can be used as a lens to
determine the Court's substantive approach to the Establishment Clause.9 But she seems not to
comprehend how this is done. Manian misstates the Court's meaning of the term "generalized
grievance," 10 a term essential to understanding how it is that Flast taxpayer standing is directly
linked to the modern Court's application of the no-establishment principle as structural rather
than as rights-based."1 Because it was explained at length in the essay, I will only summarize the
logic here. A review of the Supreme Court's cases shows that in each instance when the Court
denied standing because the claim was a "generalized grievance," it was because a structural
clause in the Constitution was ostensibly violated but no one had suffered individualized injury. 1 2
Lack of individualized injury does not always occur when constitutional structure is violated, for
sometimes a plaintiff does suffer consequential "injury in fact" and thus has traditional
standing.1 3 But when a structural clause is violated and no one has personalized "injury in fact,"
the Court will always announce a "generalized grievance" and dismiss for lack of standing.
Always, that is, until 1968 when the case of Flast came before the Court. In Flast, an alleged
violation of the Establishment Clause failed to result in any potential plaintiff with "injury in
fact." Flast was thus a "generalized grievance" case, and such cases only occur when the
underlying claim on the merits is structural in nature. It follows that the modern Court was
applying the Establishment Clause as structural. There is no other explanation for the presence
opinion. Id. at 1821. Justice Alito wrote an opinion substantially concurring with Justice Kennedy, but dissenting
with respect to the need to remand the case. Justice Alito believed that the record was sufficient and that Congress'
land-swap statute did not endorse religion. Id. at 1821. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 1824. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented. Id. at 1828. Justice
Breyer dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 1842.
9 Manian, supra note 1, at 179.
10 Manian says that "generalized grievances" occur when citizens sue because they believe the government is not
following the law. Id. at 178. That is not right. The Court has never recognized citizen standing. See Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982) (collecting
cases). Instead, the Court's focus was on federal taxpayers in both Flast and Hein. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
85 (1968); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). More importantly, however,
"generalized grievances" are not about denying standing because the class of plaintiffs is too many in number. See
Esbeck, supra note 2, at 204 n.31 and accompanying text. Rather, a "generalized grievance" is where there is a
structural violation and yet no one has individualized injury and thus no one has standing. Id. at 205, 209-10, 213-
14.
11 This conception of the clause was first noted in Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33-40 (1998). Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle have
since agreed. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 64-65 n.273 (2005). Professor Douglas Laycock, who initially opposed the concept, says that he is now
open to considering the Establishment Clause as affording structural protection of church-state relations. See
Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEo. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 260-65 & 278 (2009).
12 Esbeck, supra note 2, at 205-07 (discussing three illustrative Supreme Court cases).
13 See id. at 215-16 nn.72-74 and accompanying text (collecting five Supreme Court cases illustrative of
Establishment Clause violations that did result in consequential "injury in fact," and thus the plaintiffs had
traditional standing).
HeinOnline  -- 80 Supra: Online Companion Miss. L.J. 3 2010-2011
of the "generalized grievance" in Flast. The structural violation in Flast was that the
congressional appropriation to religious schools was a failure to properly separate these two
centers of authority, church-related schools and government.
Rather than dismiss for lack of standing, the Flast Court carved out an exception for
certain congressional expenditures under the Taxing and Spending Power.14  The carve-out
uniquely allowed a dispensation to an otherwise longstanding and universal bar to federal
taxpayer standing. Moreover, that the Court in Flast was doing so made perfect sense. It made
sense because beginning with its all-important 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education, 15
the Court's no-establishment principle was being transformed in both rhetoric1 6 and practice into
one of separating church and state. The details of what Everson meant in particular applications
had to be worked out case-by-case, but presuppositionally and in practice, the Establishment
Clause was about policing the line between government and organized religion. But, when a
case like Flast came along and no one had "injury in fact," how was the Judicial Branch to
perform its role of policing that boundary? The obstacle was overcome by resorting to the Flast
carve-out, one where the Court entertains the legal fiction that every federal taxpayer has
sufficient injury to prosecute a case, but only where government appropriations are making their
way into the hands of religious groups.1 7 That also explains why to this day the Court has never
permitted federal taxpayer standing in any type of case other than one alleging a taxing or
spending violation of the Establishment Clause.
Accordingly, the primary thrust of my essay on Hein was that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito had shown evidence that for now they would continue to approach the
Establishment Clause as structural, one where the aim is to draw a line separating the spheres of
government and institutional religion.1 9 If that was not their position then Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito had no reason to maintain the fiction undergirding Flast taxpayer standing.
Justice Kennedy was already of that persuasion, as his separate concurrence reaffirmed Flast.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, had been increasingly restive, with an
understanding of church and state occupying differing spheres of authority as policed by the
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
'" 330 U.S. 1 (1947). On the transformation brought about by Everson, see Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of
the Everson Decision and America's Church-State Proposition, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 15 (2007-08).
16 In Everson, the Court drew upon Thomas Jefferson's letter of January 1802 wherein he had written the Danbury
Baptist Association in Connecticut that "the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between church and State."' 330 U.S. at 16.
17 Like any legal fiction, the one Flast was designed to achieve was an objective not altogether achievable by logic.
The fiction was that every federal taxpayer's conscience suffers coercion when his tax monies are appropriated by
Congress to a purpose that violates the separation of church and state. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968).
That this is a fiction is easily demonstrated, made plausible only by distorting the meaning of coercion. See Steven
D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 365 (2006). Only where a tax is
earmarked for an expressly religious purpose would the tax be coercive of conscience. See Carl H. Esbeck,
Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776-1787, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 75-81 & 89-90
(2009) (explaining that Patrick Henry's proposed legislation for a religious tax to pay the salaries of Christian clergy
in Virginia was an earmarked tax defeated by the efforts of James Madison and others in 1884-85, but that such an
earmark tax is not precedent for the legal fiction entertained in Flast).
18 Esbeck, supra note 2, at 211 n.57 and accompanying text.
19 Id. at 221-23.
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Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia's full-throated condemnation of Flast left little doubt as
to where these two justices will stand in future cases.21
Given that the Hein plurality had to balance church-state separation against separation of
powers, I had a little fun at Justice Alito's expense by calling the Court's plurality in Hein a
22
"Goldilocks stance," not too hot and not too cold. Manian took the liberty of elevating my
"Goldilocks" adjective to a principle, and her response veers off from there. Manian is certainly
an unabashed devotee of the separation of church and state. Therefore, if my conclusion about
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in Hein are correct, she ought to have been relieved
because her separationist position was vindicated in its essentials. Granted, she lost the battle
because no standing was found on the facts in Hein, but she won the war because no-
establishment still structures relations between church and state. The outcome in Hein could
have been so much worse. Given that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were center to
center right appointments to the Court, Martian's separationism still came out intact. It is time to
recognize Hein for what it is: a victory where the presuppositions of both Everson and Flast
have the backing of seven justices, thus securing church-state separation and its stepchild,
taxpayer standing, for now.
20 Id. at 222.
21 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, again wrote separately in Salazar v. Buono, opining that the plaintiff
lacked standing to sue because he had no "injury in fact." Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 (2010). The increasing
practice of these two justices joining in a separate opinion concurring in the judgment isolates them and thereby
reduces their influence on the Court. This works to the advantage of those justices who would retain Flast taxpayer
standing. Unfortunately, it also reduces the number of five-justice majority opinions and thus keeps church-state
law in an unsettled state.
22 Esbeck, supra note 2, at 224.
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